Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
Volume 35
Issue 1 A Tribute to The Honorable Mary F. Walrath
2019

It's Not You, It's Us: Assessing the Contribution of Trademark
Goodwill to Properly Balance the Results of Trademark License
Rejection
Clayton A. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj

Recommended Citation
Clayton A. Smith, It's Not You, It's Us: Assessing the Contribution of Trademark Goodwill to Properly
Balance the Results of Trademark License Rejection, 35 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 267 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol35/iss1/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

SMITH COMMENT_PROOFS

1/14/2019 9:25 AM

IT’S NOT YOU, IT’S US: ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTION
OF TRADEMARK GOODWILL TO PROPERLY BALANCE
THE RESULTS OF TRADEMARK LICENSE REJECTION
ABSTRACT
In 1988, Congress amended § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the
rejection of executory contracts to allow intellectual property licensees to retain
usage rights following rejection. This addition, however, did not include
trademarks in its definition of intellectual properties. For this reason, the Circuit
Courts are currently split as to the proper treatment of the rejection of
trademark licenses in bankruptcy. The split has intensified in recent years, with
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, decided in the First Circuit
in January of 2018, directly criticizing the Seventh Circuit’s 2014 decision in
Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing. Both sides of the
split, however, fail to take full account of the unique aspects of trademark law
necessary in order to achieve the most equitable solution for all parties.
This Comment argues that, in absence of guidance from Congress and to
create the most equitable solution, courts should place paramount concern in
protecting the value of licensed trademarks. In doing so, courts should consider
the aspects of trademarks that make them distinct from the other intellectual
properties: their reflection of the expectations and goodwill of the public. With
this relationship in mind, I propose a three-factor test to help courts assess
whether favoring a licensor or licensee of a trademark would create the most
equitable result for both the estate and the public at large.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine if tomorrow morning, McDonald’s filed for bankruptcy.1 What
would happen to its thousands of franchisees? These men and women built their
businesses around those Big Macs®,2 Chicken McNuggets®,3 and
McFlurries®.4 Would they be left without the branding they depend upon as
McDonald’s reorganized, hoping to reacquire and rehabilitate its own brand?
After all, one of McDonald’s biggest assets is the power of that brand. Could
restructuring even be possible with its franchisees’ continued usage of its
trademarks, diluting the brand that it needs to come out of Chapter 11 alive?
Where would the courts come down in this struggle over the usage of licensed
trademarks?
While McDonald’s is unlikely to send its golden arches to the bankruptcy
court any time soon, smaller scale versions of trademark licensing rejection do
happen, and the Bankruptcy Code5 as currently written by Congress is inapt to
deal with them.6 Without congressional guidance, courts have taken it upon
themselves to find the most equitable solution.7 In so doing, various Circuit
Courts have split,8 leaving the prospect of how exactly any given license will be
dealt with by bankruptcy courts in flux.9 This leaves no guarantee from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction how a license will fare post-rejection, let alone
whether the treatment will be the most equitable result for all parties.
In 1988, Congress amended the portion of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with
the rejection of executory contracts to allow intellectual property licensees to
retain usage rights following rejection.10 This addition, however, did not include

1

Perhaps all-day breakfast turned out not to be the godsend it first appeared to be.
BIG MAC, Registration No. 1331342.
3
CHICKEN MCNUGGETS, Registration No. 1548683.
4
MCFLURRY, Registration No. 2805110; Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp.
198, 221 (D. Md. 1988) (ruling in favor of McDonald’s, finding that adding the prefix “Mc” to a generic word
had acquired a secondary meaning, thus making the very act a trademark of McDonald’s).
5
11 U.S.C §§ 101 et. seq (2016).
6
See Jeffrey D. Osterman & Debra A. Dandeneau, Bankruptcy and Modern Technology Transactions:
An Old Bottle for New Wine, 25 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 181 (2016).
7
See, e.g., Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chi. American Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2012); In
re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr. Del. 2003).
8
Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st
Cir. 2018); Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st
Cir. 2018), petition for cert. granted (Oct. 26, 2018) (No. 17-1657).
9
See Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 6.
10
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2016).
2
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trademarks in its definition of intellectual properties.11 This was for good reason.
Trademarks hold a unique place among the various forms of intellectual
property. Unlike patents or copyrights, which spring from the minds of their
creators to a place of value in the world, trademarks live within the relationship
between a business and its customers.12 This relationship is muddled when, as
in the case of franchising, the owner of the trademark and the purveyor of a
business are not the same legal entity. The relationship is complicated further
when the licensor of a trademark goes into bankruptcy and attempts to reject the
trademark license under the Bankruptcy Code.
Both sides of a trademark license face difficulties in the course of
bankruptcy. Licensors attempt to use bankruptcy to regain complete control over
the rights to their trademarks in order to rebuild their assets to pay off their debts
and move forward once again. Licensees attempt to hold on to rights to use the
licensor’s mark that they often have built their current businesses around. And
Congress, first through omission and then through inaction, has failed to provide
the legislative guidance to help judges sort through these complications.
Without definitive congressional word, courts have split on the proper tack
as to the rejection of trademark licensing agreements.13 One side takes the firm
line that trademark licenses receive no special treatment beyond that of any other
executory contract.14 The other treats trademark licenses more in line with those
of other intellectual properties.15 This places uncertainty on trademark licenses
throughout the nation, uncertainty that limits the value of licenses for companies
in and out of the bankruptcy system.16 All the while, the question remains as to
which approach, if either, is most equitable.17
This Comment argues that, in absence of guidance from Congress and in
order to create the most equitable solution, courts should place paramount
concern in protecting the value of licensed trademarks. In doing so, courts should
consider the aspect of trademarks that makes them distinct from the other
intellectual properties: their reflection of the expectations and goodwill of the
public. With this relationship in mind, courts should ensure that the entity which
11
James M. Wilton & Andrew G. Devore, Trademark Licensing in the Shadow of Bankruptcy, 68 BUS.
L. 739, 754 (2013).
12
See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 (5th ed. 2017).
13
See Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 6, at 198.
14
See In re Tempnology, LLC, 878 F.3d at 401.
15
See Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chi. American Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2012).
16
In re Tempnology, LLC, 878 F.3d at 404; Amicus Curiae Brief at 3, 5, Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v.
Tempnology, LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 878 F.3d 389, 401 (1st Cir. 2018)(No. 17-1657).
17
Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 6, at 193–94.
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has most contributed to the value of the relationship between consumers and
brand may continue to use the marks in question. By doing so, courts will not
only do justice in the dispute between licensor and licensee but also protect
consumers as trademark law is designed to do.
Section I of this Comment discusses the key elements of bankruptcy,
executory contract law, and trademark law necessary to a full understanding of
the issue. Section II analyzes the circuit split that currently exists over the proper
interpretation of the treatment of trademarks under § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code.18 Section III assesses the issues raised by both sides of the split, before
introducing a factor test designed to aid courts in analyzing individual cases in
a way which is neither overly rigid nor cavalierly vague toward trademark rights.
I.

BACKGROUND LEGAL CONCEPTS

Three areas of law govern the treatment of the rejection of trademark
licensing agreements: the Bankruptcy Code, executory contract law, and
trademark law. Each offers insight as to how individual trademark license cases
should be handled. First, the purposes behind the Bankruptcy Code offers an
overarching guide for what kinds of results courts should seek to create.19 Next,
executory contract law defines the kind of relationship trademark licensors and
licensees have, within which the goals of bankruptcy can be fostered.20 Finally,
trademark law is essential to understand the unique form of property at the center
of these disputes in order to come to the most equitable result for both the parties
and society as a whole.
A. The Goals of Bankruptcy
Congress established the Bankruptcy Code to further two primary goals: to
provide the debtor with a fresh start and to maximize the repayment of
creditors.21 For businesses, this is ideally served by reorganization.22 The
Supreme Court has emphasized the value of reorganization to the debtor’s fresh
start, noting that the “fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a
debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible

18

The portion of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the rejection of executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. § 365

(2016).
19
20
21
22

See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (16th 2017).
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.02 (16th 2017).
1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (16th 2017).
Id.
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misuse of economic resources.”23 Meanwhile the Bankruptcy Code mandates
that any such reorganization also pay creditors at least as much as liquidation,
ensuring that both goals are met.24 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code creates a system
in which the debtor, creditors, and society at large have an interest in
restructuring the legal and financial realities of the estate to maximize value.
B. The Role of § 365 in the Bankruptcy Code
In order to best maximize the value of the estate, the debtor in possession
may be forced to breach contracts that, at the time of bankruptcy, are
economically inefficient.25 Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the
debtor in possession of an estate in bankruptcy to reject or assume executory
contracts, with the goal of allowing the assumption of the most valuable
contracts as assets and the removal of the most burdensome.26 The traditional
standard used by the Supreme Court to determine whether a debtor in possession
has acted properly in rejecting an executory contract is the “business judgment”
rule which holds that a “debtor’s business judgment should not be interfered
with, absent a showing of bad faith or abuse of business discretion.”27
Section 365 deals with executory contracts within bankruptcy; however, the
statute itself does not define the term “executory contract.”28 The standard
definition of an executory contract follows the Countryman test,29 which states
that executory contracts are “contracts on which performance remains due to
some extent on both sides” provided that non-performance of the duties of either

23

NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
COLLIER, supra note 27; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2016), 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (2016), 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2016).
25
COLLIER, supra note 28.
26
ROBERT E. GINSBERG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN KELLEY, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKR. § 7.01
(5th ed. 2016).
27
In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 430–31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984).
28
COLLIER, supra note 28.
29
The Countryman test was originally stated in a 1973 law review article by Harvard Law Professor Vern
Countryman, who wrote that a “contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to
the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material
breach excusing performance of the other.” Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 446 (1973). This test has been looked upon favorably when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code by both
Congress and circuit courts. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, pt. 1, at 6051-52 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-989, pt.1, at 56
(1978); Lewis Bros. Bakeries v. Interstate Brands Corp. (In re Interstate Bakeries Corp.), 751 F.3d 955, 962 (8th
Cir. 2014); In re Exide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957, 962 (3d Cir. 2010); Regen Capital I, Inc. v. Halperin (In
re U.S. Wireless Data, Inc.), 547 F.3d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 2008); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Fibercom, Inc. (In
re Int’l Fibercom, Inc.), 503 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 2007); In re Spoverlook, LLC, 551 B.R. 481, 484 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 2016); see generally COLLIER, supra note 28.
24
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party would result in a material breach of the contract.30 For instance, a typical
residential real estate lease agreement is executory, as the landlord has an
obligation to allow residence and maintain a certain standard of repair, the renter
has an obligation to pay rent, and failure of either party to perform results in a
breach of the contract. Courts have applied the test in such a way as to hold that
if one party has substantially performed its obligations, the contract is no longer
executory.31
When a contract is rejected, § 365(g) provides that “rejection of an executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract.”32
While courts are split as to what extent this breach alters the contract,33 the most
common interpretation is that rejection of an executory contract allows the
rejected party to receive monetary damages from the debtor’s breach, which
transforms the rejected licensee into an unsecured creditor of the estate.34
Monetary damages are the default form of relief, but other forms are available
for certain circumstances provided for within § 365.35 Notably, Congress added
a separate provision for the treatment of intellectual property licenses.
In 1988, § 365(n) was added to allow an intellectual property licensee to
continue to use intellectual property under a prepetition license even after the
debtor in possession has rejected the license “to the extent of the licensee’s use
of the property existing immediately before the bankruptcy case commenced.”36
Section 365(n) was established in the wake of the Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. decision,37 which held that licensees of
intellectual property could not retain use of the intellectual property once the
licensing contract was rejected. This created an inherent instability for the
licensing of patents and copyrights and risked a drastic reduction in the practice
of licensing intellectual property.38 To avoid this uncertainty, Congress sought
“to make clear that the rights of an intellectual property licensee to use the
30
COLLIER, supra note 28 (citing Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973)).
31
COLLIER, supra note 28; see, e.g., In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 963 (3d Cir. 2010).
32
11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2016).
33
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.10 (16th ed. 2017).
34
Id. (Estimation of claims arising from breached contracts are covered under § 502(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code). 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(2) (2016).
35
See 11 U.S.C.S. § 365(h),(i),(n) (2016).
36
ROBERT E. GINSBERG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN KELLEY, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKR. § 7.04
(5th ed. 2016).
37
This case will be discussed in full in the next section of this Comment. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
38
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 307
(1989).
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licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of the rejection of the
license pursuant to Section 365 in the event of the licensor’s bankruptcy.”39
To this end, upon a debtor-licensor’s rejection of an intellectual property
license, § 365(n) offers a choice to the licensee: treat the rejection as a breach
and termination of the license,40 or retain the rights granted by the license,
including that of exclusivity, for the duration of the contract including any
extensions allowed under the contract and applicable non-bankruptcy law.41
While § 365(n) explicitly overturned Lubrizol legislatively for most
intellectual properties, the definition of intellectual property added to the
Bankruptcy Code in 1988 did not include trademarks.42 Explaining the omission,
Congress noted that despite the applicability of Lubrizol to all types of
intellectual property, including trademarks under the provision would “raise
issues beyond the scope of this legislation” because “trademark, trade name and
service mark licensing relationships depend to a large extent on control of the
quality of the products or services sold by the licensee.”43 The distinct problems
which could arise from this relationship “could not be addressed without more
extensive study” and thus Congress decided “to postpone congressional action
in this area and to allow the development of equitable treatment of this situation
by bankruptcy courts.”44 Courts have since grappled with the open question of
how and when, if ever, to treat trademarks in the same manner as § 365(n)
dictates for other intellectual properties.
C. Essential Aspects of Trademark Law
When Congress added intellectual property to § 365, it opted not to include
trademarks in the definition of intellectual property under § 101(35A) largely
due to the unique nature of trademarks as property.45 Unlike copyright and patent
law, which are derived from Article I of the Constitution,46 trademark
protections developed from state civil consumer protection law before being
39

S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3200 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3200.
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(A) (2016).
41
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (2016).
42
For the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, “intellectual property” includes: “trade secret,” “invention,
process, design, or plant protected under title 35 [Patents],” “patent application,” “plant variety,” “work of
authorship protected under title 17 [Copyrights],” and “mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17
[Copyrights of Semiconductor Chip Products].” 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2016). See also 35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2016);
17 U.S.C. § 101(4) (2016); 17 U.S.C. § 901(9)(b) (2016).
43
S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3200 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
44
Id.
45
See id.
46
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
40

SMITH COMMENT_PROOFS

274

1/14/2019 9:25 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

federally codified under the Lanham Act in 1946, pursuant to Congress’
commerce clause power.47 Thus, trademark law consists of both the Lanham Act
and state trademark and consumer protection laws.48
The aspects of the law that separate trademarks from the other intellectual
properties, the way trademark licenses operate and the risk of abandonment that
can arise under a trademark license, each in turn affect the way trademark
licenses are handled under § 365.
1. Unique Aspects of Trademark Law Within the Context of Intellectual
Property
A trademark is a form of intellectual property that indicates the source or
origin of a product or service so as to distinguish it from the products or services
of others.49 This source-identification function has value for both the public at
large and the owner of the mark.50 For the consuming public, the mark represents
a known standard of quality from a trusted source which allows a consumer to
make an informed decision as to which goods or services to purchase.51 For the
mark’s owner, that standard of quality represents a valuable connection between
the owner’s business and clientele and can in turn be used to market the owner’s
product.52 These dual aspects of protection are represented in the two primary
goals of trademark law: to prevent the consumer from being confused as to the
origin of a good or service, and to protect the property interests of the trademark
holder in the value of its mark.53
Because trademarks are rooted in the relationship between the mark and the
consuming public, trademark protections are distinct from other intellectual
properties.54 Broadly speaking, patent and copyright protections balance the
rights of a creator to profit from a discrete innovation or work and the interests
of the public to have greater access to this creative output; this balance is
achieved by granting the holder of a patent or copyright a temporary right to

47

15 U.S.C. § 1051(26) (2016); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 1 GILSON

ON

TRADEMARKS § 1.04

(2017).
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.04 (2017).
1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (2017).
See generally 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (2017).
1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (2017).
Id.
1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 (5th ed. 2017).
1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:3 (5th ed. 2017).
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exclude others from using the creative work or invention.55 The creator is given
time to recoup the expense of creation as well as profit, before the innovation
enters into the public domain at which point any entity is free to use it. A
trademark, on the other hand, is not an innovation but instead an identifier of
source and quality; as such, there is detriment, not value, to the public in
allowing a trademark to be used by all.56 For this reason, trademarks are valid
and protectable for a potentially unlimited length of time, provided that the mark
is in use, is seen as a non-generic source identifier of the owner of the mark, and
control is maintained over the quality of goods offered under the mark.57
2. Trademarks in Licensing Agreements
The inseparable tie of a mark to its owner makes trademark licensing distinct
from other intellectual property licensing. Whether licensing an invention under
a patent license or a creative work under a copyright license, the ability to use
something akin to a tangible item of property (e.g., a drug or a song) is being
leased to the licensee. A trademark license, on the other hand, leases the ability
of a third party to trade on the goodwill accumulated under the trademark
owner’s name, a significantly more amorphous concept which accordingly
requires a special set of rules.58
Under the Lanham Act59 trademark licenses are valid if “the licensor
maintains adequate control over the nature and quality of goods and services
sold under the mark by the licensee.”60 These licenses can be either exclusive or
non-exclusive,61 and can also be limited to a certain geographical area.62
One important subset of trademark licenses is the franchising agreement.63
In addition to the right to use a mark that is standard across all trademark
licenses, the licensor may add a variety of services and requirements, such as
training and real estate leases.64 These kinds of agreements generally involve a
much more aggressive amount of quality control compared to other trademark

55
1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.05 (2017). For patents, this temporary monopoly generally lasts for
twenty years, while copyrights can last up to seventy years after the death of their creators.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.03 (2017).
59
The Federal act which creates and governs trademark rights. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et. seq.
60
3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:42 (5th ed. 2017).
61
2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.03 (2017).
62
2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.07 (2017).
63
2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.05 (2017).
64
Id.
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licenses, with the franchisor dictating nearly all aspects of a franchisee’s
business.65
However, in all kinds of trademark licensing agreements, there is a duty of
the licensor to ensure a certain level of consistency from its licensees.66 Failure
to maintain this level of control may constitute naked licensing, which in turn
can result in the abandonment of the mark.67 In light of this need for a reciprocal
quality control relationship between licensor and licensee, Congress omitted
trademarks from § 101(35A)68 pending further study of the effects of assumption
or rejection.69
3. Abandonment
Because trademarks function as identifiers of source and quality, if, by an
act of commission or omission by the owner or approbation by the public, the
mark loses its significance as an indication of origin or standard of quality, then
the mark may be deemed abandoned and may in turn no longer warrant
protection.70 A commonly known way this happens is the process of genericide,
in which a trademark becomes a generic term for a product or service.71 Because
a trademarked name like “aspirin” or “escalator” has entered into popular use to
such a great extent that it is synonymous in the mind of the public with a kind
of good or service, not a specific brand of origin, it no longer serves the purpose
for which trademarks exist and is thus not legally protectable.72 Another way
trademarks may be abandoned is through the intentional non-use of a mark over
an extended period of time.73

65

Id.
2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.04 (2017).
67
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
68
11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2018).
69
S. REP. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
70
3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:5 (5th ed. 2017).
71
3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:8 (5th ed. 2017); see, e.g., Filipino
Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publications, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1149–52 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the term
“Yellow Pages” was deemed a generic term for a commercial phone book); Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior
Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1989)(finding the term “Murphy bed” was deemed a generic term for
bed frame that folds out from a wall); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81-82 (2d Cir.
1936)(finding “cellophane” was deemed a generic term for transparent wrapping sheets made from cellulose);
Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 304-306 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding “Pilates” was
deemed a generic term for a type of aerobic exercise program); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 51415 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (finding “aspirin” was deemed a generic term for the compound acetylsalicylic acid).
72
1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.05 (2017).
73
Id. When assessing whether the trademark owner has an intent not to use a trademark again in
commerce, the Lanham Act mandates that courts see a mark as abandoned “when its use has been discontinued
66
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In the context of licensing, a trademark can be abandoned through the
process of naked licensing, which occurs when a trademark licensor fails to
maintain adequate control over a licensee’s use of the trademark.74 Unlike
genericide, through which a trademark comes to no longer convey a specific
source, naked licensing causes a mark to lose its significance because the mark
no longer conveys a consistent standard of quality.75 This failure to maintain
quality among licensees leads to an increased likelihood that consumers, seeking
the quality they have come to expect from goods branded with the trademark,
will be deceived into purchasing sub-standard goods.76
Because failure of a trademark owner to control the quality of licensed goods
produced under its marks carries a high likelihood of consumer deception, courts
have ruled that naked licensing can cause a mark to lose its inherent
distinctiveness and thus its protection.77 Courts generally treat the inclusion of
quality control measures in the licensing agreements as sufficient protection to
stave off rulings of naked licensing.78 While naked licensing is not listed directly
in the Lanham Act, the Act does provide that a mark is abandoned if an owner’s
action or inaction caused the mark to “lose its significance as a mark.”79 This is
notable because even though consumers still associate the mark with its owner,
“the courts have traditionally treated an erosion of the designation’s capacity for
accurate identification resulting from uncontrolled licensing as a loss of
trademark significance,” potentially leading to abandonment.80
A recent example of naked licensing is Eva’s Bridal, Ltd. v. Halanick
Enterprises.81 The plaintiffs in that case had licensed the name “Eva’s Bridal”
for bridal boutiques to various relatives at several locations throughout the
greater Chicago area.82 Eventually they licensed their trademark to their

with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for three
consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
74
GILSON, supra note 66.
75
3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:48 (5th ed. 2017).
76
Id.
77
Id.; see FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 515-16 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding naked
licensing is ‘inherently deceptive’ and constitutes abandonment of any rights to the trademark by the licensor.’”)
(emphasis in original), Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (“The
Lanham Act clearly carries forward the view of these latter cases that controlled licensing does not work an
abandonment of the licensor’s registration, while a system of naked licensing does.”).
78
GILSON, supra note 66.
79
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
80
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 33, cmt. b (1995).
81
Eva’s Bridal, Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., 639 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2011).
82
Id. at 789.
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daughter’s brother-in-law under a licensing agreement that expired in 2002.83
After the license expired, the defendant continued to use the trademarks while
neither paying a royalty nor having a licensing agreement.84 When the plaintiffs
sued the defendant for lack of royalty payment, five years later, the judge
dismissed their claim, holding that the plaintiffs had engaged in naked licensing
and thus could no longer protect their mark.85
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that this ruling was correct, for at no
point, either during the original licensing agreement nor during the period of
time following its expiration, did the licensors maintain a form of quality control
over the franchises.86 The licensors argued that because bridal gowns are such
high-ticket items, and because the former licensee got its gowns from the same
designers as the licensor, a high level of quality was guaranteed.87 The court
responded that this insistence on “‘high quality’ . . . misunderstands what
judicial decisions . . . mean when they speak about ‘quality.’”88 Quality need not
mean that a product is excellent, but instead that it is consistent from location to
location.89 The court drew an analogy to various fast food restaurants: “though
neither [Kentucky Fried Chicken] nor any other fast-food franchise receives a
star . . . in the Guide Michelin . . . [a] person who visits one Kentucky Fried
Chicken outlet finds that it has much the same ambiance and menu as any
other.”90 Thus, because the licensor made no provision to ensure that customers
could expect the same experience from one Eva’s Bridal to another, the license
was naked and the trademark unenforceable.91
Naked licensing poses a threat to the ability of a trademark owner to protect
use of a trademark. This is tantamount to losing the vast majority of the value of
the mark itself. The potentially perpetual life span of a mark makes the possible
risk posed to loss of trademark through lack of control and loss of goodwill all
the greater. Congress clearly considered these distinctions when electing not to
include trademarks within the purview of § 365 in 1988.

83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. at 789-90.
86
Id. at 791.
87
Id. at 790.
88
Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 33 (3rd 1995)); see also Kentucky Fried
Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977).
89
Eva’s Bridal, Ltd., at 790.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 791.
84
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II. CURRENT STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF § 365
Most circuits hold that, because the intellectual property definition under the
Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks, courts should treat trademark
licenses not as specially protected intellectual property, but instead as ordinary
contracts.92 These courts take Congress’ decision not to include trademarks
within the statute as a statement from Congress that it did not intend trademarks
to receive special protection.93 With the influential decision In re Exide
Technologies, however, the Third Circuit signaled a desire to reconsider this
interpretation, noting in its concurrence the inequity of taking away licensees’
ability to use licensed marks.94 Since that decision, the notion that trademark
licensees may retain trademark usage rights is the standing precedent in the
Seventh Circuit,95 has been used by lower courts in the Third Circuit,96 and was
recently used by the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel before being
reversed by the First Circuit.97
A. The Majority of Circuits Use Negative Inference to Determine that
Trademark Rights Are Not Retained by Rejected Licensees
Following Congress’ adoption of § 365(n), courts inferred the omission of
trademarks from the statutory text to mean that Congress did not want trademark
licensees to receive the same protections as those of other intellectual
properties.98 Because Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to overturn
Lubrizol, but did not include trademarks, then Lubrizol was presumed to be
Congress’ intent for trademark licenses.99 Lubrizol, then, is essential to
understanding the reasoning of the courts which use this interpretation. This
section also includes an example of a more recent decision which uses the
Lubrizol precedent to determine the rights of a trademark licensee following
rejection of the licensing agreement.

92
See In re Gucci, 126 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997); Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043; In re Old
Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513
(Bankr. Del. 2003); In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 670–73 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002); In re
Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 429–31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
93
See, e.g., In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513.
94
In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957.
95
Sunbeam Products, Inc., LLC, 686 F.3d 372.
96
In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. 766, 772–74 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014).
97
Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 2018); In re
Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. 809 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016), rev’d, 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018).
98
See Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 6, at 198.
99
See, e.g., In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513.
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1. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.100
The seminal case which governs the treatment of intellectual property
licenses under § 365 is Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers,
Inc., which held that intellectual property licenses are generally executory and
that rejection of those licenses allows only monetary damages for breach as
compensation to the rejected licensee.101 Lubrizol centered on a contract
between Richmond Metal Finishers (hereinafter “RMF”) and Lubrizol
Enterprises giving Lubrizol nonexclusive rights to various intellectual properties
owned by RMF.102 When RMF entered into chapter 11, it sought to reject this
license under § 365.103 While the bankruptcy court allowed this action, finding
that the contract was executory and the rejection was done in good faith, the
district court reversed this decision on both counts.104 The Fourth Circuit
subsequently reversed the decision of the district court.105
While it is important that the court found the contracts executory,106 the true
significance of the Lubrizol decision is its holding on what happens when an
intellectual property license is rejected under § 365. Ruling the rejection of the
contract legally justified, the court declared that Lubrizol “could not seek to
retain its contract rights” and that “the statutory ‘breach’ contemplated
by § 365(g) controls, and provides only a money damages remedy for the nonbankrupt party.”107 This interpretation of § 365(g) relied on legislative history,
which “makes clear that the purpose of the provision is to provide only a
damages remedy for the non-bankrupt party.”108 Thus, because the Bankruptcy
Code made no special provisions for retaining contractual rights following
rejection, rejected intellectual property licenses could only seek monetary
damages for breach.109

100

Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043.
Id. at 1048.
102
Id. at 1045.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1048.
106
Id. at 1045 (“Applying [the Countryman] test here, we conclude that the licensing agreement was at
the critical time executory. RMF owed Lubrizol the continuing duties of notifying Lubrizol of further licensing
of the process and of reducing Lubrizol’s royalty rate to meet any more favorable rates granted to subsequent
licensees.”).
107
Id. at 1048.
108
Id. at 1045 (citing H. REP NO. 95- 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 349, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 5963, 6305).
109
Id. at 1048.
101
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2. In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc.110
While Lubrizol dealt with intellectual property generally, and did not discuss
trademarks at all, its treatment of executory contracts for intellectual property
licenses formed the basis for § 365(n)111 and subsequent litigation.112 As the
newly passed exception to § 365 did not mention trademarks, the reasoning of
Lubrizol remained the standard approach for courts handling the rejection of
trademark licenses.113 These courts reasoned that because Congress had the
opportunity to provide a new approach to trademark licenses under § 365(n), but
chose not to, then through negative inference the courts could assume Congress
thought Lubrizol the correct approach to trademarks.114
A representative example of the negative inference precedent is the
Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s decision in In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc.115 The
debtors in this case leased office space, along with amenities such as telephone
lines, videoconferencing, and reception, to other businesses; in addition, the
debtors leased their trade and service marks to franchisees who in turn offered
the same services in return for royalty fees.116 As part of the agreement, the
debtors would not operate under their own marks in any region in which they
could compete directly with a franchisee.117 Upon entering bankruptcy, the
debtors rejected the franchising contracts, and the franchisees objected.118
The court began its analysis by determining whether the contract in question
was executory.119 Because the franchisees had an ongoing obligation to pay
royalties and the debtors were required to forebear entering into a franchisee’s
territory, the court ruled that both parties had sufficient remaining obligations
within the contract to deem it executory.120 Next, the court looked to whether
110

In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507.
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018). Passed in 1988, largely in response to the Lubrizol decision; see 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201–02.
112
In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. at 190 (finding claims to trademark rights claims are dismissed under
§ 365 due to the non-inclusion of trademarks under the definition of intellectual property); In re HQ Global
Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513; In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. at 663 (noting that the plain text of the
statute excludes trademark); In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. at 431 (“by rejecting the two licenses the debtor will
deprive Farmland of its right to use the ‘Chipwich’ trademark for its products”).
113
See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. at 190; In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513; In re
Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. at 663.
114
See, e.g., In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513.
115
In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507.
116
Id. at 509.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 510.
120
Id. at 510–11.
111
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the debtors were acting in good faith by rejecting the contracts.121 Applying the
business judgment standard, the court found that the debtors’ ability to retain
their own trademarks without territorial limitation held sufficient value for the
estate as to warrant rejection.122 Having approved the rejection of the contracts
under § 365, the court then sought to determine whether the licensees could
retain use of the debtors’ marks.123
This post-rejection rights analysis began with a note that § 365 leaves the
rejected party with merely the right to claim damages for breach of contract,
barring additional protections elsewhere in the section.124 The court noted while
§ 365(n) provides additional protection for intellectual property, § 101(35A)
does not mention trademarks within the definition of intellectual property.125
Because Congress could have included trademarks, but chose not to, the court
negatively inferred the franchisees to have no special privileges under the
Bankruptcy Code.126 The franchisees in turn argued that rejection under § 365
merely excused the bankrupt estate from any affirmative obligations and that
their use of the mark did not fall within that category.127 This claim was
dismissed by the court, which declared that a franchising agreement included an
“affirmative obligation of the Debtors to allow the Franchisees to use the marks”
and was thus excused under the Bankruptcy Code and Lubrizol.128 Because
Congress did not affirmatively grant protection to trademark licensees, the only
post-rejection right trademark licensees have is that of monetary damages.
B. A (Possibly) Growing Number of Circuits Allow for Rejected Trademark
Licensees to Retain Use of the Contracted Trademarks
In the years following Lubrizol and the addition of § 365(n) to the
Bankruptcy Code, Lubrizol received a significant amount of criticism, largely
due to the decision’s over-emphasis on what constitutes an executory contract
and an under consideration of the effect on the contract itself following
rejection.129 Appropriately, the first case to move away from Lubrizol, In re
121

Id. at 511.
Id. at 512.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 513 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2018), 365 (2018)).
126
In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
See Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 374-75 (“Scholars uniformly criticize Lubrizol”); see also
Douglas G. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy, 123 n.9, 130–40 (5th ed. 2010); Michael T. Andrew, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection”, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 916–19 (1988); Jay Lawrence
122
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Exide Technologies, also dealt primarily with the determination of what
constitutes an executory contract.130 The reasoning of Exide’s concurrence
would then be picked up by the Seventh Circuit in Sunbeam Products v. Chicago
American Manufacturing to allow trademark licensees to retain use of
trademarks post-rejection, a decision that explicitly split the circuits.131
1. In re Exide Technologies
The application of the negative inference doctrine, and thus the application
of Lubrizol, to trademarks under § 365 first took a blow with In re Exide
Technologies.132 Before filing for chapter 11 relief, Exide sold most of its assets
concerning the production of industrial batteries to EnerSys for $135 million.133
Included in this contract was the perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free license
to EnerSys to use the Exide trademark on its batteries, while Exide would retain
the rights to the mark in its non-battery businesses.134 A decade after granting
this perpetual license, Exide unsuccessfully attempted to regain the rights to use
its name in the battery business from EnerSys.135 Two years after that, Exide
declared bankruptcy and attempted again to regain its trademark, this time under
§ 365.136 The Bankruptcy Court granted this rejection, and EnerSys appealed,
arguing that the contract was not executory and that, even if it were, rejection of
the contract would not terminate its rights to use the marks.137 The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, and EnerSys again appealed.138 The
Third Circuit reversed this decision.139
The Third Circuit’s decision began with a discussion of what defines an
executory contract.140 The court determined that the contract is executory if it
“contained at least one obligation for both Exide and EnerSys that would
constitute a material breach under New York law if not performed.”141 However,
if one party substantially performed its obligations, then the contract is no longer
Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470–72 (1997).
130
See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 965.
131
See Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 377–78.
132
In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 965.
133
Id. at 960.
134
Id. at 961.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 960.
140
Id. at 962.
141
Id.
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executory.142 The Third Circuit found that the district court had failed to assess
the substantiality of EnerSys’ performance and reversed the decision on the basis
that EnerSys’ payment of $135 million drastically outweighed its remaining
obligation to maintain the quality standards of Exide’s trademark.143
By declaring the contract non-executory, the court avoided answering
directly whether § 365(n) applies to trademarks. The concurring opinion written
by Judge Ambro, however, discussed directly whether the reasoning Lubrizol
should be followed for trademarks.144 Judge Ambro first noted the history of
Lubrizol and its role in Congress’ passing § 365(n), as well as the prevailing
Circuit reasoning of the non-inclusion of trademarks through negative
inference.145 Judge Ambro disagreed, however, declaring that negative inference
“is inapt for trademark license rejections.”146 He cited the congressional
record147 to find that Congress’ intention with regard to trademarks was to wait
for more information before explicitly including trademarks in the definition of
intellectual property, not a firm omission.148 He next noted that § 365 fulfills the
goal of providing the debtor with a fresh start by “merely free[ing] the estate
from the obligation to perform” while simultaneously having “absolutely no
effect upon the contract’s continued existence.”149 Because the contract was
merely breached, not destroyed, by invoking § 365, the non-breaching party
retains the rights guaranteed to it by the contract.150 Judge Ambro ended his
opinion arguing that:
Courts may use § 365 to free a bankrupt trademark licensor from
burdensome duties that hinder its reorganization. They should not—as
occurred in this case—use it to let a licensor take back trademark rights
it bargained away. This makes bankruptcy more a sword than a shield,
putting debtor-licensors in a catbird seat they often do not deserve.151

While merely dicta, this language would prove influential five years later.
142

In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 963.
Id. at 963–64.
144
Id. at 965 (Ambro, J., concurring).
145
Id.
146
Id. at 966.
147
“In particular, trademark, trade name and service mark licensing relationships depend to a large extent
on control of the quality of the products or services sold by the licensee. Since these matters could not be
addressed without more extensive study, it was determined to postpone congressional action in this area and to
allow the development of equitable treatment of this situation by bankruptcy courts.” 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200,
3204.
148
In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967 (Ambro, J., concurring).
149
Id. (citing Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007)).
150
Id.; see also 2 NORTON BANKR. L. and PRAC. § 46:57 (3d ed. 2008).
151
In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967–68 (Ambro, J., concurring).
143
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2. Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC
Judge Ambro’s dissent bloomed from dicta into legal reality when the
Seventh Circuit in Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC
became the first to explicitly move away from Lubrizol.152 Sunbeam arose when
the debtor, Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co., sold its trademark and
patent rights to Sunbeam Products.153 At the time of bankruptcy these rights
were licensed to Chicago American Manufacturing (hereinafter “CAM”).154
When Sunbeam bought the intellectual property rights, the debtor in possession
for the Lakewood estate opted to reject CAM’s licensing contract under § 365
of the Bankruptcy Code.155 Despite the rejection of the contract, CAM continued
to produce products branded with the Lakewood trademarks, arguing that its
rights to do so were protected under § 365(n). Sunbeam filed an adversary action
in response.156
While the Seventh Circuit ruled that CAM was justified in continuing to use
Lakewood’s trademarks, it did not do so by writing trademarks into the
definition of intellectual property under the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the court
declared that the omission of trademarks from the intellectual property definition
simply meant that “§ 365(n) does not apply to trademarks one way or the
other.”157 Rather, the court attacked the Lubrizol reading of § 365 as a whole,
arguing that the earlier decision failed to accurately define what effect breach
has upon a contract.158 While it is true that the licensee can seek damages, this
is simply to excuse the debtor from being forced into an order of specific
performance; the non-breaching party retains options and rights under the
contract.159
To illustrate the extent of the protections to be granted the non-breaching
party under § 365, the court analogized the rejection of the trademark license to
that of the rejection of a lease, noting that when a bankrupt landlord rejects a
lease, the damages that result do not mandate eviction of the lessee.160 Finally
declaring that Lubrizol “devoted scant attention to the question whether rejection
cancels a contract,” the court created “a conflict among the circuits” and ruled
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 372.
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 374–75.
Id. at 375.
Id. at 376–77.
Id. at 377.
Id.
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that CAM could maintain its trademark rights for the remainder of the
contractual period.161
3. In re Tempnology, LLC
Recently, a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“B.A.P.”) in the First Circuit
followed Sunbeam’s lead and broke with Lubrizol.162 In re Tempnology, LLC
concerned a dispute between the debtor, a manufacturer of cooling fabrics, and
Mission Product Holdings, a sportswear product marketing company.163 Three
years prior to bankruptcy, the debtor had granted an exclusive license to Mission
to market and distribute its “Cooling Accessories” line of products within the
United States and certain international locations.164 This license prevented the
debtor from selling its products to any sporting goods stores domestically during
the length of the contract, which was two years, with options to renew for oneyear terms.165 Though Mission had opted not to renew the contract after two
years, it retained rights to the debtor’s trademarks until July 1, 2016 due to a
contractually mandated “wind-down” period.166 Upon filing for chapter 11 relief
on September 1, 2015, the debtor opted to reject this contract under § 365.167
Mission objected on the grounds that § 365(n) granted it continued rights to use
the debtor’s trademarks for the life of the contract.168 The bankruptcy court ruled
against Mission, concluding that the contract in question dealt only with
trademark rights, which were omitted under the Code’s definition of intellectual
property and thus not protected.169
On appeal, the B.A.P. agreed that § 365(n) did not apply to trademark
licenses, but the B.A.P. held that Mission could continue to use the trademarks
nonetheless.170 The court began its discussion noting that Lubrizol was “widely
criticized” and that “Congress intended to overrule it” with § 365(n).171 Having
established an air of doubt regarding the Lubrizol approach, the court
acknowledged that trademarks are not listed as intellectual property within the
161

Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 377–78.
In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. 809. This decision was appealed and reversed by the First Circuit
in Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, No. 16-9016, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 870 (1st Cir. Jan.
12, 2018).
163
In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 811.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 813.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 814.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 825.
171
Id. at 816 (citing 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201-02).
162
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Bankruptcy Code, and thus trademark licenses are not protected under
§ 365(n).172 The court instead adopted Sunbeam’s reasoning that Congress’s
omission of trademarks under § 365(n) was “just an omission.”173 Furthermore,
the court ruled that rejection “did not vaporize Mission’s rights” to retain use of
the marks.174
A three-judge panel of the First Circuit reversed the B.A.P.’s decision with
regard to trademark usage rights.175 In doing so, the First Circuit noted that this
was an issue on which other circuits were split.176 The First Circuit began its
analysis of trademark rights post-rejection by noting that within the Bankruptcy
Code’s definition of intellectual property “Congress expressly listed six kinds of
intellectual property,” including relatively obscure intellectual properties such
as “mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17,” but did not include
trademarks.177 Trademark licenses, the court noted with no small amount of
incredulity, are “hardly something one would forget about.”178 Thus, the court
reasoned that Congress actively did not want trademark licenses protected under
§ 365(n).179 The court then turned its attention to what, if any, protections can
be found within § 365 as a whole.180
The First Circuit directly responded to the Seventh Circuit’s Sunbeam
decision throughout its decision.181 It began by noting that Congress left open
the question of trademarks in order to “allow the development of equitable
treatment of this situation by bankruptcy courts.”182 The court then applauded
the Seventh Circuit’s restraint in having “resisted the temptation to find in this
ambiguous comment outside the statutory text a toehold for unfettered
‘equitable’ dispensations.”183 Having dismissed the possibility of reading
Congress’s silence on trademarks as a blank check, the court’s focus shifted to

172

In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 820–21.
Id. at 820.
174
Id. at 822.
175
In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d 389.
176
Id. at 392.
177
Id. at 401; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A).
178
In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 401.
179
Id.
180
Id. (The court makes one particularly interesting counter example to another First Circuit case in which
it was held that “a counterparty’s right to compel the return of its own property survives rejection of a contract
under which the debtor has possession of that property.”) Though this example is not a direct analogue, it will
be worth returning to later in this Comment.
181
Id. at 401–05.
182
Id. at 401 (citing S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 6).
183
Id.
173
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Sunbeam’s analysis of the practical effects of rejection under § 365(g).184 The
First Circuit paid especial attention to the lack of “vaporizing” of contractual
rights of the non-breaching party described in both Sunbeam and the B.A.P.’s
Tempnology review.185 Though the court agreed that these rights are not
“vaporized,” it argued that those rights should be best expressed as monetary
damages, not the ability to continue to use the trademarks.186
The court noted that Congress’s goal in allowing for the rejection of
executory contracts “was to ‘release the debtor’s estate from burdensome
obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.’”187 This is best served
through monetary damages.188 With this freeing of the debtor from contractual
obligations in mind, the court argued that Sunbeam, as well as Judge Ambro’s
concurrence in Exide, are built “on the unstated premise that it is possible to free
a debtor from any continuing performance obligations under a trademark license
even while preserving the licensee’s right to use the trademark.”189 This premise,
however, is impossible due to the nature of trademark licensing law.190
The First Circuit next analyzed exactly why allowing trademark licensees to
continue using licensed trademarks without any obligation from the licensor
debtor flies in the face of trademark license law.191 In order for a trademark
license to be effective, the trademark owner must monitor and exercise control
over the quality of the goods sold to the public under cover of the trademark.”192
To do otherwise would open the possibility of the trademark no longer fulfilling
its role as a “signal of uniform quality” to the public, and thus open the mark to
the threat of abandonment through naked licensing.193 The approach of the
Seventh Circuit would therefore “force Debtor to choose between performing
executory obligations arising from the continuance of the license or risking the
permanent loss of its trademarks.”194 This essentially turns rejection under § 365
into an ultimatum: take advantage of § 365 and risk losing your trademark, or
continue to perform under the contract and essentially act as if no rejection had
184

In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 402.
Id. at 402; see Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 377; In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 822-23.
186
In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 402.
187
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984)).
188
In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 402.
189
Id. (citing Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 378; In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967 (Ambro, J.,
concurring)).
190
In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 402-03.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 402 (citing 3 MCCARTHY, MCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 18:48 (5th
ed. 2017)).
193
In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 402-03.
194
Id. at 403.
185
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ever taken place.195 Thus, Sunbeam entirely ignored the residual enforcement
burden it would impose on the debtor just as the Code otherwise allows the
debtor to free itself from executory burdens, and therefore stretched the
interpretation of § 365 larger than both its text and congressional intent will
allow.196
The majority, preempting the dissent’s biggest concern, argued against
reading too deeply into the congressional record cited in Exide and Sunbeam.
The court felt this approach gives too great an emphasis on “a few lines in the
Senate Report” over the text of the statute itself.197 The court argued that in other
portions of § 365 exceptions are explicitly written into the statute when
“Congress otherwise intended to grant bankruptcy courts the ability to
‘equitably’ craft exceptions to the Code’s rules.”198 To hold otherwise would
force courts to make “case specific, equitable” decisions not clearly supported
by the text of the Bankruptcy Code.199
The court ended its analysis by noting that, even if it were to employ a “casespecific, equitable approach,” it would hesitate to do so, as the most likely
instance in which courts would rule in favor of allowing a licensee to continue
to use a trademark would be one in which the licensing agreement had the least
built-in quality controls.200 In those cases, the debtor-licensor would thus have
few, if any, obligations post-rejection and not face an undue burden.201 This lack
of burden, however, would carry with it a drastically increased risk of naked
licensing, one made all the more potent by the “adversarial relationship” of the
two entities post-bankruptcy litigation.202 In addition, the process of determining
the most equitable solution would “sadl[e] bankruptcy proceedings with the
added cost and delay of attempting to draw fact-sensitive and unreliable
distinctions between greater and lesser burdens.”203 As such, the majority
“favor[s] the categorical approach of leaving trademark licenses unprotected
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In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 403.
Id. at 404.
197
Id. at 403.
198
Id.; see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(5)(“unless the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the
equities of the case, orders otherwise”).
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In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 404.
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from court-approved rejection, unless and until Congress should decide
otherwise.”204
In dissent, Judge Torruella argued that the First Circuit went too far in
reading Congress’s omission of trademark licenses from § 365(n) to mean that
the licenses are unprotected under § 365 as a whole.205 Instead, he argued that
the First, in creating a “bright-line rule that the omission of trademarks . . . leaves
a non-rejecting party without any remaining rights to use a debtor’s trademark
and logo” flies in the face of congressional intent.206 Citing the piece of the
Senate committee report used by Exide, Sunbeam, and the B.A.P., Judge
Torruella argued that the intention of Congress was not to omit trademarks but
instead to leave the question of trademark licenses the courts “to allow the
development of equitable treatment.”207 Judge Torruella argued in turn that the
First Circuit overestimated how much work decisions like Sunbeam do.208
Instead of inventing special rights for licensees, these courts are merely allowing
the respective parties’ post-rejection rights to be governed by applicable nonbankruptcy law.209 Finally, Judge Torruella found that the majority’s concern
over the burden of quality control placed on rejecting licensors, though
admirable, could be easily “enforced through further legal action and the
equitable remedy of specific performance” in a way that would not put an undue
burden on the debtor.210
The First Circuit’s decision in Tempnology marks the first trademark license
case on the circuit level since Sunbeam, and as such it draws a line in the sand.
The approach of the Seventh Circuit will not be slowly adopted by the other
circuits over time. Instead, the circuits will remain split until Congress revisits
the issue or the courts adopt a third, better approach.
III. ANALYSIS
Neither side of the current split offers a perfect solution to treatment of the
rejection of trademark licenses under § 365, and the split itself adds further

204
In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 405 (citing James M. Wilton & Andrew G. Devore, Trademark
Licensing in the Shadow of Bankruptcy, 68 BUS. L. 739, 760 (2013)).
205
In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 405.
206
Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting).
207
Id. at 406 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5).
208
In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 406 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
209
Id.
210
Id. at 407.
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uncertainty.211 Meanwhile, the rigid application of either approach comes with
undesired side-effects. Since the Sunbeam decision, legal observers have largely
fallen into two camps: those holding that Lubrizol’s reasoning should control for
trademarks,212 and those following the reasoning of Sunbeam allowing the
licensee to continue to use trademarks.213 Both, however, fail to take into
account the vast differences possible amongst trademark licensing agreements,
and thus fail to allow a court to assess any given license on its own terms.
Instead, courts should take a more holistic approach in order to prevent the
Bankruptcy Code from taking trademark rights from the entity that contributed
most to the trademark’s goodwill with the public, whether it be the licensee or
licensor.
A. Circuits Following Sunbeam Undervalue the Nature of Trademarks
The circuits which grant licensees continued use of trademark rights
following rejection consistently underestimate the unique properties of
trademarks, specifically the risk that comes from abandonment of the mark
through naked licensing. The Third Circuit dodged applying § 365 in Exide by
ruling that the contract in question was not executory, because the money paid
by the licensee was enough to outweigh the licensee’s continuing obligation to
maintain quality controls.214 This unfairly trivializes the importance of
maintaining quality control over a mark to prevent naked licensing and raises
numerous needless questions and confusions as to the nature of licensing
contracts.215 Because failing to maintain quality over goods produced under a
licensed trademark has the potential to render the trademark valueless, the
burden to maintain quality should always be weighty enough to be deemed a
performance due by the licensee during the life of the contract.
Even when the courts acknowledge the executory nature of trademark
licenses, they have failed to take into account the risks inherent in allowing
licensees to continue to use the marks following rejection: the threat of naked
licensing. The analogy to leasehold interests used in Sunbeam to reject Lubrizol
is indicative of this failure.216 If a landlord rejects a lease under § 365, the tenant
211
Crystal Lawson, JD Candidate, Whether Rejection of a Trademark License Agreement Terminates the
Licensee’s Rights to Use the Trademark, 7 St. John’s Bankr. Research Libr. No. 13 (2015).
212
Benjamin H. Roth, Comment, Retaining the Hope That Rejection Promises: Why Sunbeam Is A Light
That Should Not Be Followed, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 529, 580 (2014).
213
Ryan Gabay, Sunbeam: A Ray of Hope for Trademark Licensees, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 259 (201314).
214
In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 964.
215
Wilton & Devore, supra note 11, at 760; see also Eva’s Bridal, Ltd., 639 F.3d at 789.
216
Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 377.
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has the option to remain. This simply prolongs the time before the landlord can
re-lease the property, with the risks of losing the opportunity for the most
lucrative new lease and potential depreciation of the property’s value.217 If a
trademark owner is unable to provide adequate control over the licensed mark,
the risk is the complete loss of the mark for all parties involved. Judge
Easterbrook, who authored both the Sunbeam and Eva’s Bridal decisions one
year apart, should have been especially aware of this risk.218
Even if protection of the trademark could be assured, the fact remains that
not every licensee deserves the same usage rights. In Exide, the license in
question had been going on for over twelve years.219 In Sunbeam, the license
had only existed for less than half a year.220 The levels buy-in between these two
cases are drastically different. To treat them the same would not be equitable.
There are, of course, benefits to circuits following in the footsteps of the
Sunbeam precedent. Trademark owners in financial risk, but not yet in need of
seeking bankruptcy relief, are more likely to profitably find partners willing to
license their trademarks despite the cloud of financial trouble. More
significantly, in instances in which a licensee has contributed significantly to the
goodwill and trust in the mark in the minds of the public, that trust is not put into
jeopardy by bankruptcy suddenly stripping the license.
However, these benefits pale in comparison to the greater threat of the
license falling into naked licensing territory, risking the abandonment of the
mark and thus the complete loss of the property value to all involved. This risk
of lost value spills out to not just the licensor and licensee, but also the entire
creditor pool. This greater threat requires greater protection. More importantly,
the instances in which a licensee has contributed significantly to the goodwill of
the trademark, in comparison to the licensor, are likely very few. To grant a
licensee of six months the same protection as a licensee of twelve years serves
neither the goals of bankruptcy nor the aims of trademark protections.

217
Benjamin H. Roth, Comment, Retaining the Hope That Rejection Promises: Why Sunbeam Is A Light
That Should Not Be Followed, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 529, 570 (2014).
218
See Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 377; Eva’s Bridal, Ltd., 639 F.3d at 789.
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In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 960–61.
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B. Circuits Which Do Not Allow Licensees to Retain Use Better Respect
Trademarks but Are Too Rigid
The courts which do not follow Sunbeam take Congress’ decision not to
include trademarks within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of intellectual
property as reason not to grant usage to licensees post-rejection. This approach
better protects trademarks in the vast majority of cases. However, this approach
is also too broad and likely comes less from deference to Congress and more
from an unwillingness to decide on the merits of a case. It also poses economic
risks of its own.
Of the two approaches taken by the courts, this is the approach least likely
to risk the trademarks in question.221 Because licenses rejected under this
approach can no longer be used by the licensee, there is no risk of uncontrolled
use. This means there is no risk of naked licensing, obviating the biggest threat
to the trademark itself.
This strict reading is not without tradeoffs of its own. Jurisdictions which
hold that trademark usage by the licensee must end following rejection risk a
chilling effect on the ability of financially unstable businesses to license
trademarks. It is not inconceivable that a cash-poor business with strong
trademarks could be able to license out those marks to other entities which have
the resources necessary to produce or products the mark owner simply could not
afford to, providing the revenue necessary to keep the business afloat. If,
however, the would-be licensee knows that at any moment the mark owner could
declare bankruptcy and revoke the trademark license, then the ability of the
trademark licensor to successfully license its mark in a way to stave off
bankruptcy is drastically reduced.
Once a trademark licensor in such a jurisdiction enters bankruptcy, however,
the greater control exercised by trademark holders could better allow for
financial return on the mark as contemplated by § 365. If a debtor can regain its
trademark rights, the debtor is in turn able to either use the marks for its own
economic purposes or sell them off at a higher rate of return than would be
possible if the current license were allowed to stand.
In some instances, however, the licensee has contributed to the value of the
trademark so significantly that the public views it, as much or more than the
licensor, as the provider of the goods in question. In these cases, such a strict
reading does not serve justice. For the licensee, a significant component of its
221
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business is stripped away for a sum of money that cannot truly compensate for
that loss. For the fellow creditors, the value of the breached contract will likely
be so much as to overwhelm many smaller debts. And most importantly, for the
public at large, the goods the trademark had come to represent will no longer
mean what it once did.
Meanwhile, this reading of the statute as exclusively negating the ability of
a trademark licensee to continue use of marks, regardless of circumstances, is
too strong for mere negative inference to bear. While the canon of negative
inference is well established within statutory interpretation,222 in this instance
Congress’s intent is hardly murky. It could be argued that perhaps the act of
inferring congressional intent over the plain language of the statute is beyond
the scope of a judge’s purview.
C. The Glaring Issue
Because Congress’s silence on the matter is likely to continue into the
indefinite future,223 the circuit split necessarily creates uncertainty within all
trademark licensing agreements. Meanwhile, problems inevitably arise with
both approaches.
Two truths exist simultaneously at the heart of this circuit split. First,
decisions such as Sunbeam failed to go far enough to protect the marks in dispute
from risks such as naked licensing while potentially hampering the ability of
trademark owners to properly restructure. Second, some instances exist in which
the rigidity of the Lubrizol approach for trademarks would be inequitable. No
two trademark licenses are created equal. Treating a thirty-year exclusive license
of a brand built in part from the sweat of the licensee the same as a one-year,
non-exclusive license that has yet to use the brand in commerce is not equitable.
As such, courts faced with trademark rejection under § 365 should weigh a series
of factors to determine the most equitable result for the licensor and licensee, as
well as the creditors of the estate. These factors should be designed to protect
the mark itself, which in turn protects value in the estate and consumers at large.
The facts of Exide provide an excellent illustration of this problem. Consider
the following counterfactual: all of the facts of Exide, with the sole exception
that instead of having paid for its license in one initial lump sum, EnerSys’s
agreement with Exide had been a perpetual, exclusive license that EnerSys paid
222

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“expressio unius est exclusio alterius”).
See Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 375 (“The subject seems to have fallen off the legislative
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for with annual lease payments.224 This structure of contract would almost
certainly have to be seen as executory225 and thus require a § 365 analysis.
EnerSys held the license to produce batteries under the Exide name for
twelve years before Exide’s bankruptcy.226 During this time, each Exide battery
the consuming public bought developed a relationship not only with EnerSysproduced batteries but also with the Exide brand as a whole. Thus, a symbiotic
relationship formed. EnerSys produced batteries of a consistent quality under an
established name. Exide received both regular payments for that right and the
added value and goodwill to their brand in the eyes of the public that EnerSys
contributed. Most importantly, the public came to expect a consistent standard
of quality that came from EnerSys’s Exide batteries.
For a court to allow the Bankruptcy Code to sever this relationship would be
injustice, not only to EnerSys, but to the public at large who have come to view
EnerSys as the source of Exide batteries. On the other hand, to grant the same
opportunity to continue to use trademarks under license to an entity that has held
a non-exclusive license for only a year would be similarly unjust to the
trademark owner, both because of the lack of built goodwill and the risk of naked
licensing.
D. Balancing of Interests
The overriding maxim that courts should use to square this circle when
determining trademark decisions under § 365 is that protection of the mark itself
is of paramount importance. To hold otherwise risks destroying a significant
asset which could be used by the debtor to regain a fresh financial footing and
to pay off would be creditors. Meanwhile, the courts should attempt to apply the
consumer protections of trademark law whenever possible to best protect society
as a whole.
By allowing rejection of an executory contract, courts have already admitted
that the debtor has acted in good faith.227 Courts should not ignore, however,
that a licensee’s use of the mark following rejection has to potential to help the
debtor in the long run. The continued availability of trademarked goods or
services despite the debtor’s financial troubles through the licensee could have

224

See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 960–61.
Even the Third Circuit would have likely seen the contract to be executory. See In re Exide Techs., 607
F.3d at 964.
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In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 960–61.
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a positive effect on the longevity of the mark, providing a foundation of goodwill
the debtor could draw from post-bankruptcy. The possibility also exists that the
licensee’s use of the mark could contribute to the overall health of the brand in
other ways: for instance, keeping the mark in commerce during the tumultuous
bankruptcy process, thus preventing the mark from entering abandonment.228
That being said, if the courts grant the licensee the ability to continue to use
the mark in question, there must be some mechanism in place to prevent the
trademark use to devolve into naked licensing. One could argue that the
licensee’s interest in using the trademark is sufficient to trust it to maintain the
mark; however, this likely takes too charitable a view of human interactions.
Having gone through the rejection of a licensing contract and the resulting court
actions, very little imagination is required to foresee vindictive licensees saving
money on quality control to maximize profits for as long as the now-rejected
trademark rights allow. Thus, courts will need use their equitable powers to
mandate maintenance of quality of products produced under the mark in order
to prevent the loss of the mark through abandonment.
Keeping in mind that the proceedings in question are bankruptcy
proceedings, courts should first and foremost consider the value adjustment the
results of their decisions will have on the estate in bankruptcy. Because rejection
of a contract under § 365 is subject to a business judgment standard,229 if courts
rule that rejection is allowed, the licensor should have a prima facie assumption
of regaining its rights. A licensee’s continued use of a trademark following
rejection could have a series of adverse effects on the value of the estate. The
debtor might be less able to restructure its business post-bankruptcy. Should the
debtor choose to sell its trademark rights entirely, whether through liquidation
or as part of restructuring, the selling price might be substantially less if the new
buyer cannot be guaranteed exclusive rights to the mark. This has the potential
to lower the amount available to repay creditors.
On the other hand, the larger the licensing contract, the larger the cost
breaching will add to the unsecure creditor pool. Moreover, even if retention of
the trademark through rejection adds a significant value to the estate, other
factors might be sufficient to outweigh this value and demand that the licensee
retain use of the license.

228
229

See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); GILSON, supra note 72.
See In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. at 430-31; see also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 523.
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E. Proposed Solutions
Any equitable solution must rectify the problems created by each side of the
circuit split: the lack of protection for trademark assets created by Sunbeam, and
the overly strict bright-line of the majority of circuits.
Congress’s potential answer is the Innovation Act.230 The act seeks to
remedy this situation by explicitly adding trademarks to the § 101(35A)
definition, while also creating a statutory requirement that if a licensee elects to
retain the trademark rights following rejection, the licensee must both maintain
the quality of services offered under the mark and enforce quality control for
those products.231 This solves the confusion as to definition currently dividing
the circuits, as well as the open risk of naked licensing-caused trademark
abandonment under the Sunbeam precedent. However, there is also the risk that
a one-size-fits-all approach to an issue as uniquely complex as trademark
licensing might cause more ill than good.
Most notably, this approach by Congress would essentially set into stone the
Sunbeam approach, while taking steps to remove the risk of naked licensing.
This fails to take the goals of bankruptcy and trademark law, and the basic justice
they represent, into full account. An ideal law would allow the debtor the best
possible chance to restructure in such a way as to become economically viable
and productive once again. If the debtor is unable to regain full control over an
exclusive license, for instance, then significant potential areas of restructuring
are off the table from the start. If the license in question had only been in place
a short period of time, before the licensee could establish itself as the provider
of the licensed products in the minds of the public, then trademark law would
offer no policy justification for allowing this level of hindrance to the debtor’s
restructuring.
This is likely a moot concern from a practical standpoint. Due to a host of
changes the act also makes to patent law, the act is currently bogged down in
legislative limbo, unlikely to emerge any time soon.232 If the current state of
affairs is to change, it will likely have to do so in the courts.
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F. The Factor Test
In order to serve the goal of protecting a licensed trademark, courts should
seek to determine which entity has to this point developed the goodwill
relationship with the public upon which the trademark is built, while
simultaneously protecting the mark from the existential threat of naked
licensing. The two factors which best represent this building of a relationship
are time and exclusivity. A licensee cannot build goodwill with consumers
without having served them for some length of time. Meanwhile, a licensee who
is the exclusive purveyor of goods under a name to the public is more likely to
have developed a relationship worth protecting.
These two factors are of value because they cut both ways, depending upon
the facts of an individual case. While the length and exclusivity of a licensing
agreement can be obstacles to the estate’s retaining value and the possibility of
a fresh start, they can also speak to a certain level of buy-in by a licensee.
Notably, a licensee’s commercial use can help to increase the value of a brand.233
In instances in which the licensee, perhaps under a long-term exclusive license,
used the licensor’s trademark in commerce in such a way as to significantly
contribute to the public’s goodwill toward the brand, that licensee’s rights of use
should be weighed accordingly.
This is not to say that these factors will favor licensors and licensees each
roughly half the time. The facts of most cases will likely come down in favor of
licensors. This is appropriate, as in the vast majority of cases, a licensor bears
vastly more responsibility for the goodwill of the public than any individual
licensee. However, this factor test is useful precisely because of the few cases in
which it will rescue those licensees that have built significant equity in a brand
from the starkness of a bright-line rule. It would be inequitable to deprive a
licensee of use of a mark when the licensee bears responsibility for the marks
growth and value. These factors provide a solution not only for the good of
individuals on either side of a licensing agreement, but for the public at large,
which has built a relationship with the brands in question.
1. How Long was the Licensing Agreement in Place before Bankruptcy?
In order to ensure that the entity which most contributed to the goodwill of
the trademark retains use of the mark, a court should first assess how long the
licensee used the mark pre-bankruptcy. Trademarks are, at their core, reflections
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of a relationship between a commercial entity and its consumers. This is why
use in commerce is an essential component of any form of trademark
protection.234 A licensee could not have built a meaningful connection to and
relationship with consumers without some significant period of pre-petition use.
How long, then, must a licensee have used a trademark in order to have
contributed to the mark in a significant way? Unfortunately, there is no brightline rule that could or should be drawn to show when a product has been in the
market long enough to develop a relationship. One potential guideline may be
the Lanham Act, which offers time frames for both incontestability and
abandonment of marks.235 Practically speaking, however, courts should assess
factual indicators of the licensee’s relationship with consumers. Items such as
number of years producing the product, percentage of the trademark’s market
share created by the licensee, and consumer survey data should all be taken into
account in order to determine whether the license has been in place long enough
to have the necessary effect.
A licensee needs time in order to develop a significant measure of goodwill
with the general public. Without that time, and the subsequent goodwill and
association, a licensee should not be allowed to maintain use of a mark. Time
alone, however, merely provides the opportunity for this goodwill and must be
viewed in conjunction with the next factor.
2. Is the License Exclusive?
Courts should next consider whether and to what extent the license is
exclusive. The exclusivity of a license is important for two reasons: it offers
insight into the potential for the relationship a licensee has built with its
consumers, as well as for threatening the debtor-licensor’s ability to gain a fresh
start.
If a license is exclusive, whether in terms of product line or geography, the
licensee is drastically more able to develop a source-provider relationship with
the public. If a licensee is the sole provider of a specific type good or service,
even if another entity provides different goods or services under the same mark,
then for that specific good or service consumers are likely to consider the
licensee the source. This is equally true if the licensee is the sole user of a mark

234

See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
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within a given region. On the other hand, if a license is non-exclusive, then the
licensee is almost certainly not going to be seen as a source provider by the
public.
A non-exclusive license holds much less risk of diminished value to the
estate. On the other hand, an exclusive license could lead to instances in which
the licensor, in its attempt to reorganize post-bankruptcy, might be prevented
from using its own name in the region or area of commerce in which it seeks to
operate.236 This set of circumstances should be avoided generally. However, in
instances where some measure of exclusivity has led to the licensee’s
contributing a significant amount of goodwill to a brand, courts should rule this
factor in favor of the licensee.
Thus, exclusivity is a near requisite for a court to rule that a licensee should
be allowed to maintain use of a mark following rejection. This requisite is not
sufficient, however; the significant period of pre-petition use of the mark of the
previous factor must be co-requisite.
3. What is the Risk of Naked Licensing?
Given the risk of abandonment posed by naked licensing, courts should
always take its potential into account when determining who may or may not
use the marks. After all, if a trademark is abandoned, there is nothing left to
protect. When assessing this point, a court might take into account the amount
of buy-in from the licensee. A licensee that has built much of its own business
around the strength of a mark is unlikely to risk the destruction of the mark in
order to cut cost or quality. On the other hand, a non-exclusive licensee with
little investment in the name might be more than willing to save money on
quality control in order to recoup the costs of an expensive bankruptcy litigation,
leaving the mark significantly more at risk.
The liquidity and financial health of the licensee should also be considered.
A licensee with clean bill of financial health is much less likely to cut corners
with quality than one on the brink of bankruptcy itself. Given that rejection under
§ 365 and subsequent litigation will likely leave the licensee with no goodwill
between itself and the debtor, an additional financial incentive to produce goods
or services of inconsistent quality should not be allowed.
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G. The Factor Test in Practice
These three factors ideally serve to protect the value of a trademark. The
length of use of a trademark and the exclusivity of that use combine to provide
a strong estimation of how likely the general public is to view an entity as the
source of goods denoted by that trademark. Meanwhile, assessing for the
potential of naked licensing mitigates the risk posed by the court’s decision.
These factors, however, must be tested with fact patterns in order to demonstrate
that they are capable of achieving just results. In this section, I will run the
factors through three fact patterns: first a hypothetical bankruptcy of
McDonald’s, then the facts of Tempnology, and finally a modified version of the
facts of Exide. Having done so, the flexibility and efficacy of the test will be
more apparent.
1. Hypothetical McDonald’s Bankruptcy
With the factor test in mind, I return to the question posed at the beginning
of this Comment: what is the most equitable solution should a corporation like
McDonald’s go bankrupt? Given the strength of the corporation’s brand,237 this
sort of hypothetical is important, as no factor test would be of any value if it had
the potential to drastically disrupt a cornerstone of the worldwide economy. For
the purposes of this hypothetical, I will assume that the court is dealing with the
rejection of the executory contract which allows an individual franchisee to use
McDonald’s trademarks.
First, the court would look to how long the individual franchise had been in
existence. The oldest McDonald’s franchise still in existence opened in 1953.238
This means that, for a few franchises anyhow, multiple generations of consumers
have come to develop a relationship with that individual store. A franchisee has
an indefinite length of contract, allowing it to continue to use the trademark
rights so long as the provisions of the contract are met, giving the option of this
relationship to continue long into the future.239 Some franchises thus have a

237
McDonald’s brand is currently valued at $97.72 billion. Millward Brown, 10 most valuable North
American brands in 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/259061/10most-valuable-north-american-brands/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
238
Adam Chandler, The Owner of the Oldest McDonald’s on the Minimum Wage, THE ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/09/heres-what-the-owner-of-the-oldest-operatingmcdonalds-has-to-say-about-minimum-wage/379624/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
239
McDonald’s, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/
mcdonalds/282570# (last visited Nov. 14, 2017); Acquiring a Franchise, MCDONALDS.COM, http://corporate.
mcdonalds.com/mcd/franchising/us_franchising/acquiring_a_franchise.html.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
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legitimate argument as to having contributed to the brand for a significant period
of time.
Time alone is not enough to have contributed to a brand. In order for a
franchisee to have developed enough of a relationship with the consuming public
for a consumer to reasonably expect the wares to come from that particular
franchisee, exclusivity must come into play. An individual franchise by its
nature is not exclusive. There are over 14,000 McDonald’s franchises in the
United States alone.240 The average franchisee owns six franchises, often in the
same geographic region.241 It is simply not feasible to assume that any consumer,
even in a region dominated by one franchisee, buys a Big Mac and assumes that
Big Mac came from the franchisee specifically, not McDonald’s at large. This
lack of exclusivity makes it unlikely any individual franchisee could develop a
source-provider relationship with its consumers.
If a significant number of now-former franchisees are allowed to use
McDonald’s trademarks following rejection, stores across the country would
operate under the McDonald’s name without the draconian hand of the
McDonald’s corporation mandating quality and consistency. Given that so much
of McDonald’s value comes from the ability of consumers from across the
country to know that the food will be essentially the same at any store they visit,
this possibility is ruinous and unacceptable to McDonald’s.
Franchises are a symbiotic relationship. A franchisee’s successful execution
of the franchise builds goodwill for the entire brand in the mind of its customers.
At the same time, the franchisee chooses to enter into the franchising agreement
in order to trade upon the goodwill which already exists for the brand in the mind
of consumers. In the case of McDonald’s, the time has passed when any given
franchisee could lay claim to having built a significant portion of the
McDonald’s trademark’s goodwill.
Thus, McDonald’s would be allowed to reject its franchising agreements
under § 365 in order to undergo a potentially drastic reduction of its stores in
order to rehabilitate its brand. This is the proper result from a public policy
perspective. As unfortunate as losing a business is for an individual franchisee,
the relative good McDonald’s has brought to the country and world as a whole

240
Number of McDonald’s restaurants in North America, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/
256040/mcdonalds-restaurants-in-north-america/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
241
Bryan Gruley & Leslie Patton, McRevolt: The Frustrating Life of the McDonald’s Franchisee,
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 16, 2015) https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-mcdonalds-franchises/ (last visited
Jan. 28, 2018).
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is orders of magnitudes greater. As such, the ideal legal result should err on the
side of McDonald’s eventual rehabilitation.
2. In re Tempnology, Revisited
Having seen the factor test applied to the hypothetical bankruptcy of a fast
food giant, I will now apply it to an actual case: Tempnology. When applied, the
factors will produce the same just result as the First Circuit without drawing the
needlessly strict bright-line.
First, the court would assess how long the licensee operated under the
trademark license before its termination. Mission Products held a license to the
trademarks in question for slightly under three years before the bankruptcy
proceedings.242 This is a relatively short period of time, especially when one
factors in the ramp-up period it took before Mission could put the trademarks
into use. As such, it is unlikely that many, if any, consumers had the opportunity
to come to know Mission as the source of the products in question.
This likelihood is lessened further when factoring in the license’s nonexclusivity.243 This means that consumers neither in a given region nor of a
specific product line came to view Mission as the sole source of the products in
question. There is no reason to believe that Mission developed a source-provider
relationship with the public worth protecting.
Finally, the potential risk of abandonment through naked licensing is far too
great to allow Mission to continue to use the marks, while the benefit to the
public of allowing Mission to use the marks is negligible if it exists at all. As
such, monetary damages for breach are more than sufficient remedies for
Mission under § 365.
3. The Exide Counterfactual
Finally, I return to the counterfactual version of Exide mentioned earlier in
the Comment, in which the facts of the case are the same with the exception of
a payment structure that makes the contract inarguably executory. Here, the
factors will produce an equitable result that favors the licensee.
The court would first assess how long EnerSys licensed the Exide name to
produce batteries: twelve years.244 Twelve years is a significant period of time,
242
243
244

In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 811.
Id.
In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 960–61.
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especially in a technology sector. That was over a decade of time in which Exidebranded batteries meant batteries produced by EnerSys. Given that the Lanham
Act requires only three years of non-use for a mark to be presumed abandoned,
this is likely enough time to form a goodwill relationship with the public.245
While there is enough time involved, time alone is not enough for a licensee
to establish a claim to the goodwill of a brand sufficient to warrant the courts’
allowing trademark use to continue post-petition. To establish this, the court
should next look to exclusivity. EnerSys operated as the exclusive producer of
Exide-branded batteries over the twelve years of its license.246 For over a decade,
any battery bought by the public with Exide on the label was produced by
EnerSys. Meanwhile, Exide itself produced no batteries during this time
period.247 Thus, for the period in question, EnerSys practically speaking was
Exide for batteries.
This is an incredibly compelling argument for allowing EnerSys to continue
using the Exide trademark. However, the court must assess the risk of naked
licensing before allowing EnerSys to continue to use the name. After all, should
Exide be found to have nakedly licensed its name, then the brand risks losing its
protectable mark for all who use it.248 The licensing agreement Exide signed
with EnerSys had clear quality control standards.249 The combination of the
contractual obligation to maintain a standard and the buy-in EnerSys showed
over the twelve years of exclusive production are likely enough to make any risk
of naked licensing minimal.
Thus, the most just course of action for both EnerSys and the consuming
public which has come to associate EnerSys-produced batteries with the Exide
name is to allow EnerSys to continue to use the trademarks under the license.
CONCLUSION
Trademark law exists to protect the relationship between the source of a
product or service and its consumers. Happily, the Bankruptcy Code can be used
by courts to serve this purpose as well, while also protecting the value of the
estate. Unfortunately, both sides of the current circuit split are not using the full
power they wield as courts of equity to achieve these goals.
245
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (This is presumably evidence of Congress’s perspective on how fast
perspective changes in our economic lives).
246
In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 960–61.
247
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248
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249
In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 963.
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The factor test outlined in this Comment offers one possible way bankruptcy
courts could change that. Decisions like Sunbeam leave trademarks at risk of
naked licensing, and they overvalue the status of short-term licensees. While the
bright-line rule of decisions like Tempnology rightfully weigh the importance of
protecting trademarks and thus consumers, they run the risk of injuring those
customers through a lack of flexibility. In instances like counter-Exide, courts
following that precedent would be violating the principle of consumer
protection, as there is a real likelihood that the name “Exide” will no longer
mean in fact what it does in the minds of the paying customer. Thus, in order to
maintain the consumer protections inherent in trademark law, some level of
trademark producer continuity is necessary. This is best achieved through a more
fact specific and less bright-line approach such as the factor test outlined above.
From Exide to Sunbeam to Tempnology, the past decade alone has seen a
dramatic increase in the number of circuit court cases dealing with trademark
licensing agreements in bankruptcy. This trend is unlikely to change until
Congress or the Supreme Court weighs in on the matter.250 When a solution
finally comes, let us hope that it weighs the aspects of consumer protection
inherent in trademark law in determining the most equitable result of the
bankruptcy proceedings.
CLAYTON A. SMITH*
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